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INTRODUCTION 
The UGA does not want this Court to reach the merits of the City's 
arguments, and it offers various unpersuasive procedural reasons to deflect the Court's 
attention. This Court should reach the merits, because the UGA asks for enforcement of 
an agreement whereby it claims it was entitled to receive from the City for free a parcel 
of property valued at about $160,000. Cases from this Court, however, make such an 
agreement with a municipality invalid. The UGA has already received more value than it 
paid for, and this Court should not overrule settled legal principles established to protect 
public assets. Yet, even if the agreement were valid, the express condition precedent 
contained in the agreement for requiring the transfer of the property never occurred. 
Thus, the City did not breach the agreement. The district court should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY AND THE UGA IS 
ULTRA VIRES AND UNENFORCEABLE 
A. The Agreement Lacks The Required Consideration For 
Transfer of Municipal Assets 
Under Utah law, the type of consideration required for the transfer of 
public property is not the typical "bargained for exchange" that is required in contracts 
generally; instead, the consideration must be a specific, "present benefit that reflects the 
fair market value." Municipal Bldg. Auth. v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273, 282 (Utah 1985); 
see Sears v. Ogden City, 533 P.2d 118, 119 (Utah 1975); Salt Lake County Comm n v. 
Salt Lake County Attorney, 1999 UT 73 If 31, 985 P.2d 899, 910 (Utah 1999). The UGA 
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attempts to distinguish Sears, Lowder, and Salt Lake County Commission by arguing that 
those cases involved "outright gifts," Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 26 
(hereinafter "Answer Brief), while here, the City received consideration in the form of 
the UGA's willingness to leave its prior offices and move its operations to the new club 
house. Answer Brief at 21-22, 25. The UGA misstates the facts of Sears, Lowder, and 
Salt Lake County Commission, and a willingness to move offices does not come close to 
the kind of consideration those cases required. 
In Sears, this Court held that a city is not authorized under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-8-2 to dispose of its real property by gift. Sears, 533 P.2d at 119. Whether a 
proposed transfer constitutes an illegal gift is not based simply on whether there was any 
consideration at all, but on whether the transfer was "for an adequate consideration." 
Sears, 533 P.2d at 199 (emphasis added). 
In Lowder, this Court built on the principles of Sears and concluded that, 
like municipalities, counties also hold public property "in trust for the use and benefit of 
the constituents of the owning entity" and thus can dispose of county property only for 
adequate consideration. Lowder, 711 P.2d at 282 (citing Sears and finding Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-8-2 analogous to Utah Code Ann. §§ 17-4-3, 17-5-481). Again, this Court's 
analysis centered not on whether there was any consideration at all for the proposed 
transfer, but on whether the consideration was a "present benefit that reflects the fair 
market value" of the property to be transferred. Lowder, 711 P.2d at 282. This Court 
1
 Section 17-5-48 is now codified as Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-242. 
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held that the use of a new jail facility and the ability to reacquire the site in 20 years was 
"a speculative and future benefit that cannot suffice to validate a present transfer of the 
fee." Id. 
In Salt Lake County Commission, this Court extended the principles of 
Sears and Lowder to include transfers of money as well as real property. Salt Lake 
County Comm 'n, 1999 UT 73 \ 31, 985 P.2d at 910 (citing Sears and Lowder), Again, 
the analysis focused not on whether there was any consideration at all, but on whether 
there was "adequate consideration," meaning a "present benefit that reflects the fair 
market value." Id. The Court held that "a general finding . . . [of] a benefit, without 
specifying exactly what that benefit is, in present market value terms, is not specific 
enough to qualify the benefit as adequate consideration." Id. 
Thus, under the principles of Sears, Lowder, and Salt Lake County 
Commission, the mere existence of some oblique benefit to the municipality is not 
sufficient to validate a proposed transfer of public property. The UGA argues that 
because the "agreement is a complete package and cannot be divided into two parts that 
are distinct from each other," Answer Brief at 21, this Court should find that the 
consideration for the promised conveyance of the UGA property was the UGA's 
willingness to leave its current offices and move its operations to the new club house. 
See Answer Brief at 21-22, 25. Whether the lease and the promise regarding the UGA 
Property are viewed as separate agreements or as a "complete package," however, the 
3 
result is the same. Either way, no adequate consideration was provided, anywhere, for 
the UGA Property.2 
While the UGA may be "the oldest and largest organization of amateur 
golfers in the state of Utah and Utah's representative with the United States Golf 
Association," and while it may indeed have been a "tremendous undertaking" for it to 
move, Answer Brief at 21,25, this type of general and unquantifiable benefit is 
insufficient to validate the transfer of public property. The Agreement proposed to 
transfer the UGA Property "at no cost to User," R. 27«[[ 4, and even assuming the UGA's 
move provided some general benefit to the City, there is no evidence, or even an 
assertion, that this move provided a specific and quantifiable present benefit that 
reflected the fair market value of the UGA Property. See Lowder, 111 P.2d at 282; Salt 
Lake County Comm % 1999 UT 73 % 31, 985 P.2d at 910. 
There was simply no consideration of the type required by Sears, Lowder, 
and Salt Lake County Commission for the transfer of the UGA Property.3 The 
2
 By analogy, if the agreement were for the simple transfer of two parcels of City 
property, Sears and Lowder would clearly require "adequate consideration" for each 
parcel. In essence, that is what happened here because the Agreement included the 
transfer of the leasehold interest in the office space for the payment of rent, and the 
potential transfer of the UGA Property or its sale proceeds. Thus, consideration would 
be required for each transfer, but no consideration was contemplated for the latter. 
3
 Even the rent paid by the UGA for the office space was not adequate 
consideration for the proposed transfer of the UGA property. The rental payments 
represented at most the lease value of the office space and could not have simultaneously 
represented the value of the UGA Property. In fact, the UGA's lease payments under the 
Agreement were below the fair market value of the office space leased. See Appellants' 
Brief at 20-21. Similarly, any payments the UGA would have made under an extended 
20-year lease also would have represented the rental value of the office space in the club 
4 
Agreement to transfer the UGA Property or its sale proceeds is, therefore, outside the 
scope of the City's powers and is ultra vires and unenforceable. See McQuillan, The 
Law of Municipal Corporations § 29.91 (3d ed. 1999). Without an enforceable 
agreement, the City can have no liability, and the UGA can recover no damages. The 
ruling of the district court should be reversed.4 
B. The Municipal Building Authority Could Not Convey Title to 
The UGA 
The Agreement between the UGA and the City is also ultra vires and 
unenforceable because the Agreement purports to obligate the Municipal Building 
Authority to transfer the UGA Property to the UGA, and the Municipal Building 
Authority has no authority to do so. Although Utah's Municipal Building Authority Act 
authorizes municipal building authorities to "acquire, improve, or extend one or more 
projects and to finance their costs on behalf of the public body that created [them]," 
house and not the value of the UGA Property. See Appellants' Brief at 22-23. 
4
 In addition to attempting to distinguish the Sears line of cases, the UGA 
asks this Court to reject the fundamental principles recognized in Sears, Lowder, and Salt 
Lake County Commission by arguing that no more consideration is required here than is 
required generally to support agreements between private parties. Answer Brief at 26-27. 
In support of its argument, the UGA cites Healthcare Servs. Group, Inc. v. Utah Dept. of 
Health, 40 P.3d 591 (Utah 2002). The reasoning of Healthcare Servs. is inapplicable 
here, however, because its analysis focuses on Utah Constitution art. VI section 29, 
rather than Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-2 or other analogous provisions. See Lowder, 711 
P.2d at 282 (finding Utah Code Ann. § 17-4-3 and 17-5-48 analogous to § 10-8-2). 
Section 10-8-2 governs the disposal of municipal property, and this provision has been 
clearly and unequivocally interpreted by this Court to require that municipal property be 
transferred for nothing less than "adequate consideration." Sears, 533 P.2d at 119. 
Moreover, Healthcare Servs. involved an agreement between a private party and a state 
agency, not a municipality, for the provision of services, not the transfer of public 
property. Thus, it is a very different kind of case. 
5 
municipal building authorities are not empowered to dispose of property to anyone other 
than the public body that created them. See Appellants' Brief at 24; Utah Code Ann. 
§ 17A-3-903(l),(2). 
Despite the clear limitations of Utah's Act, the UGA argues that the 
Agreement is nevertheless enforceable because the Municipal Building Authority never 
actually owned the property and the City never intended that the UGA Property be a part 
of the golf course project. Answer Brief at 28. Whether the Agreement was factually 
feasible is irrelevant, however, because on its face, the Agreement purports to obligate 
the Municipal Building Authority to do something that it has no authority to do-convey 
the UGA Property to the UGA. R. 27 Tflj B, F; R. 32 ffl[ C, I. Moreover, the Municipal 
Building Authority has authority only to deal with property that is part of a "project" as 
defined by the Act. If the UGA Property is not part of a project, as the UGA argues, then 
by definition the Municipal Building Authority did not have power to deal with it and 
could not have transferred it. 
C. The City is Obligated to Challenge the Enforceability of the 
Agreement Concerning the UGA Property. 
A "municipal corporation cannot in any manner bind itself by any contract 
which is beyond the scope of its powers," and "[w]hen a municipality goes beyond the 
law, the person who deals with it in doing so does so at his or her own risk." McQuillan, 
The Law of Municipal Corporations § 29.04 (3d ed. 1999) (emphasis added); see 
Thatcher Chem. Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 21 Utah 2d 355, 358, 445 P.2d 769, 771 
(Utah 1968). The UGA argues, however, that the City must honor the terms of the 
6 
Agreement, regardless of whether it is ultra vires, because the Agreement "is a detailed 
written agreement that was negotiated," and because the City itself should not be allowed 
to challenge the enforceability of the Agreement. Answer Brief at 22-23. 
The UGA misses the point. Because a city cannot bind itself "in any 
manner" by an ultra vires contract, the issue is not whether the contract was carefully 
negotiated or who is challenging its enforceability, but how best to protect the public's 
assets entrusted to the City. To this end, "[i]t is better that the innocent contracting party 
suffer from the municipality's mistakes than to adopt rules, which, through improper 
combination or collusion, could be detrimental or injurious to the public." McQuillan, 
The Law of Municipal Corporations § 29.04 (3d ed. 1999). 
It is important to remember, however, that the UGA will not suffer at all if 
the Court reverses the district court's decision. The UGA paid less than $120,000 for six 
years' use of office space at the club house that the parties agreed was worth more than 
$ 150,000. See Appellants' Brief at 21. Thus, the UGA has already received more than 
full value for what it paid. Under the law, it is not entitled to more. 
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II. EVEN ASSUMING THE AGREEMENT IS ENFORCEABLE, THE 
CITY DID NOT BREACH ANY PROVISIONS OF THE 
AGREEMENT 
A. Any Defects on the Title Were Irrelevant Because the UGA was 
Only Entitled to the Sale Proceeds 
Under the clear terms of the Agreement, the UGA was entitled to 
conveyance of the title to the UGA Property only if it first elected to construct its 
headquarters and the Utah Golf Hall of Fame on the Property and had its plans approved 
by the City. R. 34 If 6. Because the UGA had decided not to build on the UGA Property, 
it was instead entitled only to the proceeds from the sale of the property (and then only if 
it first agreed to a 20-year lease). R. 34 f^ 7(a). Thus, any defects on the title to the UGA 
Property were irrelevant since the UGA was only entitled to the sale proceeds, or, in 
other words, the value of the property. The district court should not have found that 
defects on the title resulted in a breach. 
B. Any Defects on the Title Were Irrelevant Because Performance 
Was Not Due and the Defects Were Not Irremediable 
According to the UGA, because it "stood ready to perform its part of the 
Agreement and enter into a 20 year lease extension," the time for performance had 
arrived and the City was obligated to perform by conveying clear title to the UGA 
Property. Answer Brief at 30-32. Merely "standing ready to perform" is not the same as 
performing, however, and until the UGA actually satisfied the condition precedent, the 
City was under no obligation whatsoever to perform by clearing the defect or conveying 
title. Where "performance by the plaintiff is a condition precedent to his right to demand 
8 
performance of the defendant, such performance must be averred" to sue on the contract, 
and an allegation that the plaintiff was "ready and willing" to perform is not equivalent to 
an averment of performance.5 Brooks v. Scoville, 81 Utah 163, 17 P.2d 218, 220-221 
(1932). 
Here, the UGA had no right to sue for performance of the Agreement until 
the condition precedent had been satisfied. The UGA refused to enter into a 20-year 
lease with the City, however, causing a failure of the condition precedent. Thus, the time 
for the City's performance had not arrived. 
Because the time for performance had not yet arrived, any defect on the 
title could not have constituted an anticipatory breach unless the defect was irremediable. 
See Appellants' Brief at 29-30 (citing cases). The UGA never argued and does not now 
argue, and the district court made no finding, that the defect was irremediable. The UGA 
simply argued, and the district court found, that the defect had not been cured at the time 
the UGA demanded performance. R. 222-223; R. 528 % 14. At the very least, the district 
court should be reversed and the case remanded for a determination of whether the 
defects were irremediable. By mistakenly focusing on whether the defect had been 
cured, rather than whether the defect could be cured, the district court prematurely and 
incorrectly concluded that the City had anticipatorily breached the Agreement. In fact, 
5
 The only time being "ready and willing" to perform a condition precedent 
is sufficient is when the other party has anticipatorily breached the contract. See R. 224; 
Brooks v. Scoville, 81 Utah 163, 17 P.2d 218, 220, 221 (1932); see also Hidalgo 
Properties, Inc. v. Wachovia Mtg. Co., 617 F.2d 196, 199 (10th Cir. 1980). "Ready and 
willing" cannot be used, however, to support the argument that the condition precedent 
has been actually satisfied and thus the time for performance has arrived. 
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the use restriction complained of by the UGA could have been removed by the City. 
R. 321 T[ 6. Because the time for performance had not arrived and the defect was not 
irremediable, there was no breach. The ruling of the district court should be reversed. 
III. THE CONDITION PRECEDENT IN THE SECOND ADDENDUM 
WAS NOT AN UNENFORCEABLE AGREEMENT TO AGREE 
Because the district court improperly concluded that the City had 
anticipatorily breached the Agreement by not immediately perfecting the title to the UGA 
Property, it excused the UGA's actual performance of any of the condition precedents. 
The district court looked next to whether the UGA had at least been "ready and willing" 
to perform a condition precedent, and concluded that the 20-year lease condition 
precedent in the Second Addendum was an unenforceable agreement to agree. R. 224. 
This conclusion was wrong. 
The UGA relies on Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., the same 
case relied upon by the district court. Answer Brief at 36 (citing also Cottonwood Mall 
Co. v. Sine, and Browns Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch). The UGA, however, completely ignores 
the crucial distinction between the Pingree line of cases and the facts of this case. In 
those cases, the lease provision at issue was a covenant promising an indefinite option to 
renew. Here, on the other hand, the provision is simply a condition precedent, and 
conditions precedent are entirely different from covenants. 
While covenants determine what must be performed to discharge duties, 
conditions simply determine when and if the duties defined in the covenants must be 
performed. Because of their unique nature, conditions precedent are not required to be 
10 
explicitly based on wholly objective criteria or to be enforceable agreements in their own 
right. In fact, a condition precedent may be based solely on one's personal satisfaction 
with the quality of the performance for which he has bargained. 3 A Arthur L. Corbin, 
Corbin on Contracts § 644 at 78-79 (1960). 
The UGA responds that the 20-year lease provision in the Second 
Addendum is not a "satisfaction" requirement, and that it actually reserves to the City a 
unilateral right of termination that makes it unenforceable. That is not true, and the case 
cited by the UGA in support of its argument is easily distinguished from this case. See 
Answer Brief at 37 (citing Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 
706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985)). 
In Resource Management, the parties negotiated a contract for oil and gas 
royalties in which the company expressly reserved the right to terminate the contract "in 
its sole discretion" upon the occurrence of a certain condition subsequent, which was if 
the company determined that there was not sufficient promise of minerals of commercial 
value on the property. Resource Management, 706 P.2d at 1034. Here, however, there 
was no express right of termination of any kind, and any implied right of termination 
could have been used by either party. Both the UGA and the City had to agree to terms 
of a 20-year lease, and thus both had the same opportunity to cause a failure of the 
condition precedent. Therefore, the analysis of Resource Management does not support 
the UGA's argument. 
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Resource Management does support the City's position, however, in 
another respect. In Resource Management, this Court held that even the express right of 
termination in that case did not grant the company an unqualified, unilateral right of 
termination because the right to terminate the contract only arose upon a determination 
that there was not sufficient promise of minerals of commercial value. This Court 
concluded that if "one party reserves the right to terminate a contract upon the 
occurrence of a condition subsequent, the contract is not unenforceable ab initio for lack 
of mutuality of consideration." 706 P.2d at 1037. Even though the determination as to 
whether there was sufficient promise of minerals of commercials value was to be made in 
the company's "sole discretion," that did not confer an arbitrary power on the company 
because the "law generally imposes a duty to perform contractual obligations in good 
faith." Id. 
In other words, while courts do endeavor to construe contracts so that one 
party does not have a unilateral right of termination, see Answer Brief at 37, they do so 
not by finding the contract provision unenforceable, as the district court did here, but by 
finding, if possible, an implied covenant to act in good faith. See Resource Management, 
706 P.2d at 1037-1038; see also Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 
1317, 1321 (Utah 1976) (discussing cases which uphold lease options with undetermined 
terms by implying a mutual agreement for a reasonable rental). Here, the district court 
found an implied covenant to negotiate an extended 20-year lease in good faith, which 
limited the City's right to avoid the occurrence of the condition precedent by requiring 
12 
that the City not act capriciously or in bad faith.6 R. 441. As a result, the City did not 
have an arbitrary, unfettered right to unilaterally avoid the occurrence of the condition 
precedent contained in the Second Addendum, and it was a valid condition precedent. 
Public policy supports this conclusion. Contrary to the UGA's assertions, 
upholding the 20-year lease provision in the Second Addendum would not require this 
court to determine a specific dollar amount for the 20-year lease provision. Answer Brief 
at 37-38. As explained previously, because the provision was a condition precedent and 
not a covenant, the district court simply needed to look to see if an extended lease 
agreement had been made. See Appellants' Brief at 35-36. The ruling of the district 
court should be reversed. 
IV. THE UGA ALSO FAILED TO SATISFY THE CONDITION 
PRECEDENT OF THE FIRST ADDENDUM 
Because it concluded the condition precedent in the Second Addendum 
was an unenforceable agreement to agree, the district court looked to the condition 
precedent in the First Addendum and found that the UGA had at least been "ready and 
willing" to perform under those terms. R. 224. This finding, however, was in error. 
6
 Of course, the UGA also would have been required to negotiate a new 20-year 
lease in good faith. Where title to the UGA Property was itself irrelevant to the terms of 
a new 20-year office lease, and where the district court found that the UGA did not 
mitigate its damages by refusing to negotiate a 20-year lease despite the defects on the 
title to the UGA Property, R. 443-45, that is tantamount to a finding that the UGA did 
not negotiate in good faith. Thus, the UGA itself caused the failure of the condition 
precedent by breaching its own obligation under the Agreement to negotiate in good 
faith. It should not be allowed to collect damages for its own breach. 
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The UGA argues that it satisfied the condition precedent in the First 
Addendum because it "was ready and willing to sign a 20-year lease extension" before 
the expiration of the original term of the lease. Answer Brief at 39. The UGA, however, 
did not make an offer meeting the terms of the First Addendum until December 8, 1999, 
almost a full year after the original term of the lease had expired, and the day after the 
City had voted to discontinue negotiations and prepare an eviction notice. R. 148; 
R. 150-151. If the provision from the First Addendum is considered to be an option to 
extend as the district court apparently believed it was, Utah law is clear that option 
provisions must be strictly complied with. See Appellants' Brief at 37-38. The UGA did 
not strictly comply with the terms of the option provision in the First Addendum, nor was 
it ready and willing to do so. At the very least, an issue of fact exists on this point that 
would preclude summary judgment. The ruling of the district court should be reversed.7 
7
 The UGA argues that this issue is raised for the first time on appeal. 
Answer Brief at 39. To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, the key is whether the 
court was provided with "an opportunity to rule on the issue's merits." West One Bank, 
Utah v. Life Ins, Co., 887 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Here, the City is arguing 
that the UGA never actually complied with, and never evidenced a willingness to comply 
with, the clear terms of the option provision in the First Addendum. The district court 
ruled on this issue when it expressly held that the UGA had been ready and willing to 
perform under those terms. See R. 224. 
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V. THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE RECONSIDERED ITS 
GRANT OF PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR THE UGA 
The district court should have reconsidered its prior grant of partial 
summary judgment and it erred by refusing to do so.8 The UGA argues that the Motion 
for Reconsideration was untimely. The prior partial summary judgment ruling on 
liability did not dispose of the whole case, however, and the City's Motion for 
Reconsideration was filed before the end of discovery and before the district court had 
set a trial date. R. 253-255; 389-390. Under these circumstances there could have been 
no prejudice to the UGA. The Motion for Reconsideration was timely. 
The UGA next argues that the Motion for Reconsideration was improper 
because it raised two defenses that were allegedly waived because they were not raised in 
the City's Answer9: (1) the Agreement was ultra vires because of no adequate 
8
 The UGA asserts that the district court's decision not to reconsider its grant 
of partial summary judgment should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Answer Brief 
at 9. While the ultimate decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion, the initial decision to consider such a motion is 
reviewed for correctness. Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1310, 1312 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). Here, because the district court refused to consider the City's 
Motion for Reconsideration, its ruling is reviewed de novo. R. 424. 
9
 It is not even clear that the issue of whether the time for the City's 
performance had arrived is an affirmative defense. A Rule 8(c) affirmative defense is a 
defense employed to defeat a plaintiffs claim by raising matters outside or extrinsic to 
the plaintiffs prima facie case. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson, 923 
P.2d 1366, 1374 (Utah 1996); see also Creekview Apartments v. State Farm Ins. Co., 
Ill P.2d 693, 695 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (explaining that an avoidance under Rule 8(c) is 
"a defense independent of the allegations in the pleadings"). In other words, a defense 
that directly assails or "merely controverts [a] plaintiffs prima facie case is negative in 
character"and is not an affirmative defense. Jones, Waldo, 923 P.2d at 1374. The UGA 
asserts that the City breached the Agreement because the time for performance had 
arrived, and the City argues that the clear terms of the Agreement itself prove otherwise. 
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consideration, and (2) there was no breach because the time for the City's performance 
had not yet arrived and the title defect was not irremediable. Answer Brief at 8,17,19. 
These issues were raised in the City's Answer, however. In its Ninth Defense, the City 
asserted that the UGA's claims were barred by a failure of legal consideration. R. 96-97 
THf 57-58. This certainly covers the City's argument that the Agreement was ultra vires 
because of no adequate consideration. And, in its Fourth and Seventh Defenses, the City 
asserted that the UGA had breached and failed to comply with the terms and conditions 
of the Agreement, and that the UGA's claims were barred by a failure of conditions 
precedent. R. 95, 96 fflf 47-48, 53-54; see also R. 941f 34. Because the UGA failed to 
satisfy the condition precedent, the time for the City's performance had not yet arrived. 
The fact that the defect in title was not irremediable is a natural extension of this defense, 
because it only further shows that the UGA's performance of the condition precedent 
was not excused. These defenses were not waived.10 
Thus, this defense controverts the UGA's case, and it is not an affirmative defense 
subject to waiver. 
10
 Even assuming these are affirmative defenses which were not raised in the 
City's Answer, affirmative defenses are not automatically waived by failure to raise them 
in an answer. Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnel Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 58 
(Utah 1986). In fact, affirmative defenses may be raised by a motion for summary 
judgment. Smith v. Spain, 1998 WL 4358, *1 (10th Cir. Jan. 8, 1998); Camarillo v. 
McCarthy, 998 F.2d 638, 639 (9th Cir. 1993) (cited with approval in Ring v. Lexington 
Apartments & Motor Inns-Oklahoma, 3 Fed. Appx. 847, 851, 2001 WL 95144, *3 
(10th Cir. 2001)); United States v. Alaska, 197 F. Supp. 834, 836 (D. Alaska 1961). In its 
discretion, the court may also treat the motion for summary judgment as a motion to 
amend. See, e.g. McGuinness v. University of New Mexico Sch. of Med., 170 F.3d 974, 
979 (10th Cir. 1998); Evans v. McDonald's Corp., 936 F.2d 1087, 1090-1091 (10th Cir. 
1991). 
In determining whether affirmative defenses are timely raised in a motion other 
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The district court should have considered these legal arguments because 
they presented the matter to the district court in a "different light," and because they 
presented controlling Utah law that would have materially affected the outcome of this 
case. Had the district court given proper consideration to these issues, the outcome 
would have been different; therefore, a manifest injustice resulted when the court refused 
to reconsider its prior ruling. See Trembly, 884 P.2d at 1311 (reciting factors a court can 
consider in determining the propriety of reconsidering a prior ruling, including whether a 
manifest injustice will result if the court does not reconsider its prior ruling, whether the 
matter is presented in a different light, and whether the court needs to corrects its own 
errors). 
Finally, the UGA argues that the new evidence presented in the City's 
Motion for Reconsideration was irrelevant. Answer Brief at 17-18. To the contrary, 
however, the affidavit offered by the City went directly to the issue of whether the defect 
than an answer, the court should consider whether the plaintiff had notice of the defense 
and adequate time to respond. See Ring v. Lexington Apartments & Motor Inns-
Oklahoma, 3 Fed. Appx. 847, 851, 2001 WL 95144, *3 (10th Cir. Feb. 5, 2001), 
Camarillo, 998 F.2d at 639; 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1271. 
Here, the UGA had notice of these legal arguments and an opportunity to respond, and it 
has not even made an allegation of prejudice. As a result, even if the City failed to raise 
these issues in its Answer or in the first partial summary judgment proceeding, these 
issues may still be properly addressed in its Motion for Reconsideration and Summary 
Judgment. See Entrup v. Colorado, 1994 WL 396048, *3 (10th Cir. July 29, 1994) 
(stating that where an affirmative defense was not raised in an answer, motion to dismiss, 
or summary judgment, the problem may have been cured through a subsequent motion 
for reconsideration). In the final analysis, "where the substantive rights of the parties are 
not endangered, the manner of raising the defense is unimportant." Alaska, 197 F. Supp. 
at 836. 
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on the title to the UGA Property was irremediable, and thus whether there could have 
been any anticipatory breach of the Agreement. R. 321 f^ 6. New evidence is one of the 
factors to be considered by a court in determining the propriety of reconsidering a prior 
ruling, see Trembly, 884 P.2d at 1311, and the district court here should have accepted 
this evidence and reconsidered its prior grant of partial summary judgment in light of the 
long-settled law on the issue. Instead, the district court granted the UGA's Motion to 
Strike and refused to consider this crucial and material evidence. R. 422. The ruling of 
the district court should be reversed. 
VI. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CALCULATING THE UGA'S 
BENEFIT-OF-THE-BARGAIN DAMAGES 
The UGA argues that it had the right to "sue for the loss of its expectation 
of receiving the building lot," and that the "measure of damages for this loss was the fair 
market value of the lot," with nothing deducted. Answer Brief at 40. An essential step 
in calculating benefit-of-the-bargain damages, however, is to deduct from the value the 
non-breaching party would have received from performance of the contract the costs that 
party would have incurred in performing the contract. See Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 
143, 150-151 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 347. By 
deducting nothing from the value of the UGA Property when awarding damages, R. 446, 
the district court either erred in calculating damages or recognized that the Agreement 
provided no consideration of the type required by Sears, Lowder, and Salt Lake County 
Comm 'n, for the UGA Property. Either its ruling should be reversed pursuant to these 
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cases, or the case should be remanded to the district court to deduct the costs the UGA 
would have incurred by performing.11 
VII. IF THE CITY PREVAILS, THE COURT SHOULD AWARD IT 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
The Use Agreement provides for attorney fees and costs to the prevailing 
party in litigation. R. 20. The district court awarded attorney fees and costs to the UGA. 
R. 550. If the City prevails on this appeal, it requests attorney fees and costs incurred on 
this appeal and in the district court. In that case, this Court should remand the case to the 
district court for a calculation of attorney fees and costs. The UGA did not address this 
issue in its Answer Brief. 
VIII. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO 
AWARD THE UGA MOVING EXPENSES 
The UGA cross-appeals, arguing that the district court erred in declining to 
award the UGA its costs of moving. Answer Brief at 41-44. The district court denied 
the UGA its moving expenses because it found the UGA had a duty to mitigate its 
damages by agreeing to a 20-year lease and then independently pursuing its rights 
regarding the UGA Property. R. 443-445. The UGA now argues that it had no duty to 
mitigate its damages because the City could have mitigated damages for it by clearing 
title and by not evicting the UGA in the first place. Answer Brief at 43. This argument 
1 l
 The most likely possible cost the UGA avoided by not having to perform 
was the present value of the amounts the UGA would have paid the City over the life of a 
20-year lease. Agreeing to a 20-year lease was the only thing the UGA was supposed to 
do to get the proceeds from the UGA Property. (Yet, as discussed above, the payments 
made under a 20-year lease would have been consideration only for the office space and 
not for the UGA Property.) 
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makes no sense, because it is the plaintiff, and not the breaching party, who has a duty to 
mitigate damages under the doctrine of avoidable consequences.12 See Mahmood v. 
Ross, 1999 UT 104 % 31, 990 P.2d 933, 940 (Utah 1999); Pratt v. Board ofEduc, 564 
P.2d 294, 298 (Utah 1977). 
The UGA claims the City breached the Agreement long before the City 
evicted the UGA and before the parties even started negotiations on a 20-year lease. The 
evidence was undisputed that the City would have allowed the UGA to remain in the 
club house space and that the UGA did not have to move. R. 565 at 83-85, 125. The 
City only evicted the UGA because the UGA refused to negotiate a lease that did not 
include a transfer of the UGA Property free of any restrictions. See Answer Brief at 14, 
31,33. Thus, the district court's ruling that the UGA failed to properly mitigate its 
damages is the only logical and reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts. 
The UGA also argues that mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense, 
and because it was not raised in the City's Answer, the district court had no right to 
consider it. Answer Brief at 44. This argument is also without merit. The UGA made 
no objection to the assertion of the defense at trial and it allowed the issue to be tried. 
See R. 565. "[B]y not objecting, the [UGA], in turn, waived this defective mode of 
12
 The case cited by the UGA in support of its argument, Alexander v. Brown, 
646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982), simply states that where there was equal opportunity for 
performance, a breaching party should not be heard to complain about the other party's 
failure to perform. Here, however, the question is not whether the UGA performed its 
obligations under the contract - the question is whether, after a breach had allegedly 
occurred, the UGA fulfilled its duty under the doctrine of avoidable consequences to 
mitigate its damages. 
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placing the [defense] in issue." Golding v. Ashley Central Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897, 
899-900 (Utah 1990). "When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or 
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been 
raised in the pleadings." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b); see Zions First Nat 7 Bank v. Rocky 
Mountain Irrigation, Inc., 795 P.2d 658, 663 (Utah 1990). The district court correctly 
concluded that the UGA failed to mitigate its damages. 
IX. THE CITY DID NOT BREACH ANY IMPLIED COVENANT OF 
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
Finally, the UGA argues that this Court could uphold the decision of the 
district court based upon the doctrine of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. Answer Brief at 44-45. Specifically, the UGA argues that by not immediately 
perfecting the title to the UGA Property at the UGA's demand, the City acted 
unreasonably and violated the implied covenant. Answer Brief at 44. In the alternative, 
the UGA argues the City should have just paid the fair market value of the property to 
the UGA. Answer Brief at 44-45. As explained in detail above, however, the City did 
not act unreasonably by not immediately perfecting title because a seller is not required to 
perfect title until the time for performance has arrived, and here the time for the City's 
performance had not yet arrived. 
The UGA also asserts that the City acted unreasonably by suggesting that 
the UGA enter into the 20 year lease and then work with the developer to resolve the use 
restriction on the deed. Answer Brief at 45. Although the City did advise the UGA of 
the desirability of this option, see R. 565 at 94, 131, this was by no means the City's only 
21 
or final position. The City also attempted to negotiate the value of the UGA Property 
directly into the UGA's new 20 year lease. See R. 565 at 92; Appellants' Brief at 28-29. 
Furthermore, this suggestion by the City is very similar to what the district court said the 
UGA should have done to mitigate its damages—enter into a 20-year lease and resolve 
the property issue later. 
Thus, it was the UGA, and not the City, that acted unreasonably by 
prematurely demanding the defect be cleared. Although the UGA knew its rights under 
the Agreement were subject to a condition precedent, and that as a result, "[i]n order to 
obtain the lot, the UGA had to [first] sign a 20 year extension of the lease," Answer Brief 
at 10, the UGA admits that it nevertheless repeatedly refused to enter into a new lease 
and demanded the City cure title. See Answer Brief at 14 ("The UGA required North 
Salt Lake to be able to convey the lot free and clear from the use restrictions before 
entering into a new lease.") (emphasis added); see also Answer Brief at 31, 33. Thus, the 
UGA, and not the City, acted unreasonably and violated the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. The district court found as much when it concluded that the UGA 
had failed to mitigate its damages by entering into a 20-year lease regardless of the 
defects on title. Had the UGA properly, and in good faith, negotiated a 20-year lease 
agreement, it is doubtful the parties would now be before this Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the City asks that this Court reverse the district 
court's judgment and the rulings underlying that judgment. If the Court, however, agrees 
with the district court that the Agreement included "adequate consideration" and that the 
City breached the Agreement, the Court should remand to the district court for a 
recalculation of damages. The Court should also deny the UGA's cross-appeal regarding 
the mitigation of damages. If the City prevails on this appeal, it requests attorney fees 
and costs incurred in this Court and in the district court. 
DATED this 29th day of July, 2002. 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
LarTy S. Jh^Mr^ ^ 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
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